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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
grATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DANNY GLISPY, and 
JAMES HALLAM, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal from a verdict of Guilty to a charge of Ra:pe, 
and from the judgment and sentence imposed thereupon 
by the Honorable Maurice Harding, District Judge of the 
Fourth Judicial District of the State of Utah, in and for 
Utah County. 
The appellants will hereinafter be referred to as the 
Defendants and the plaintiff and respondent will be referred 
to as the State. 
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2. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Danny Glispy and James Hallam were 
charged in the Fourth District Court in and for Utah Coun-
ty, State of Utah, with the crime of rape, allegedly com-
mitted on the 27th day of August, 1958, in Utah County, 
Utah, as follows, to-wit: 
"That they, the said Danny Glispy and James Hallam 
at the time and place aforesaid, did then and there wilfully, 
unlawfully and feloniously, with force and violence, ravish 
and carnally know and have sexual intereourse with Her-
mer Linda Martinez, who was then and there not the wife 
of the defendants Danny Glispy and James Hallam, and 
without her consent and against her will and resistance, 
and ove:vcoming her resistance with force and violence." 
(R. 6). To the charge contained in the information each 
defendant entered a plea of "Not Guilty", and the case was 
set to be tried before a jury on February 2, 1959 (R. 9). At 
the conclusion of the trial on February 3, 1959, the jury 
was una!ble to reach a verdict and the case was ordered 
reset for a new trial (R. 14). At the conclusion of the sec-
ond trial on May 4, 1959, the jury returned a verdict as to 
each defendant of "Guilty of rape as charged", (R. 23; R. 
24; R. 63) , and on May 22, 1959 the trial judge sentenced 
each defendant to confinement in the Utah State Prison 
for an indeterminate term of not less than 10 years (R. 64). 
Notice of appeail as to each defendant from such verdict 
and judgment was filed on May 29, 1959 (R. 56) and the 
matter is now before the Court. 
Upon the trial of the case the State called as witnesses 
Dr. A. L. Curtis (Tr. 4), Hermer Linda Martinez (Tr. 10), 
Rosalie Kinser Dudley (Tr. 40), Marcia Hallam Rowley 
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(Tr. 45), and Truman Hood (Tr. 50). The defendants 
called as witnesses James Hallam, one of the defendants 
(Tr. 55), Bruce White (Tr. 81) and John S. Niemiec (Tr. 
84). 
From the evidence introduced it appears without sub-
stantial conflict that on or about the 27th of August, 1958, 
in the evening of that day, the defendant Danny Glispy was 
driving a Nash Automobile belonging to his mother-in-law, 
and that he had with him the defendant James Hallam, 
Rosalie Kinser (now Rosalie Dudley), and Marsha Hallam 
(now Marsha Rowley), and that after seeing the complain-
ing witness, Hermer Linda Martinez at the Payson carnival 
they picked her up in said Automobile in the vicinity of 
her home in Payson (Tr. 14; 41; 46;) and went for a ride 
up Payson Canyon. Miss Martinez fixed the time of their 
leaving for the Canyon at fifteen or twenty minutes after 
eight (Tr. 15); Rosalie Kinser at "around 8:30 or 9:00 
o'clock" (Tr. 41); Marcia Hallam at "around 9:00 o'clock" 
(Tr. 46) and defendant Hallam at "right around nine o'clock" 
(Tr. 56). With defendant Glispy driving they rode up Pay-
son Canyon for about five miles to Walker Flat where they 
stayed for about fifteen mnutes (Tr. 16, 17, 42, 46, 56), 
and then they drove back down the Canyon for a distance 
of some two miles and stopped again on the side of the road 
where Rosalie Kinser and Marsha Hallam got out of the car 
and walked baok up the road a short distance to "use the 
bathroom" (Tr. 20, 43, 47, 57). 
At this point the testimony of Miss Martinez, the com-
plaining witness, diverges substantially from the other wit-
nesses. She testified that after the other two girls had 
gone back up the road, the defendants forced her to re-
mam in the car (Tr. 21), put the back of the right front 
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seat into a reclining position (Tr. 23), proceeded to hold 
her down while taking her pedal pushers and pants off (Tr. 
24, 25) , and then first defendant Hlallam and then defend-
ant Glispy, while threatening her, forceably had intercourse 
with her over her violent protests and objections (Tr. 26, 
27). She further testified that she was restrained by the 
defendants in the car while the above activity took place 
"for about an hour" (Tr. 33), and on cross-examination she 
stated that during all of such time she was kicking, cursing 
and yelling loudly (Tr. 36). 
The other witnesses for the State, Rosalie Kinser and 
Marcia Hallam testified concerning this second stop to the 
effect that they got out of the car and went back up the 
road for a short distance to "use the bathroom" (Tr. 43 
and 47) ; that they were at all times in view of the car; (Tr. 
43 and 47) ; that they were gone from the car for only five 
minutes (Tr. 43 and 47) ; that they heard no noises com-
ing from the car while they were gone, and if someone had 
yelled or screamed in the car they would easily have heard 
it (Tr. 43, 45, 47). Defendant Hallam testified relative 
to this period that when the two girls left the car, the two 
defendants started "messing around a little bit" with the 
complaining witness (Tr. 57), and when she started to re-
sist by kicking and hollering they immediately stopped (Tr. 
58) . On cross-examination defendant Hallam testified that 
in "messing around" with the complaining witness he felt 
her breasts and that as they tried to get her pants down 
a little ways she called them names, started fighting and 
kicking and hollering so they immediately quit (Tr. 73-74), 
and he testified that neither of the defendants had anymore 
to do with the complaining witness (Tr. 66). 
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The complaining Wlitness further testified on direct ex-
amination that after the other two girls came back to the 
car, she had a conversation with them concerning what 
had supposedly happened in the car (Tr. 33), but on cross-
axamination she admitted that she did not even mention to 
either of the other girls anything about what she claimed 
happened in their absence (Tr. 37). Witness for the State, 
Rosalie Kinser, further testified that when she returned 
to the car she did not notice anything unusual about the 
actions of the complaining witness (Tr. 44), although the 
complaining witness testified she was crying and very up-
set (Tr. 30). 
All witnesses were in agreement that after leaving the 
SECOnd parking spot in Payson Canyon, they drove to the 
carnival in Payson where they separated and the complain-
ing witness said she was going home (Tr. 35, 44, 49). Wit-
nesses for the State, Rosalie Kinser and Marsha Hallam, 
testified that they arrived back at the Payson carnival at 
ten minutes to ten (Tr. 45 and Tr. 49). 
The complaining witness testified further that as she 
was walking home from the carnival she was picked up by 
one Bill Hood (Tr. 35) who gave her a ride to Santaquin 
(Tr. 35) , and that on the way back she first told Hood 
what had supposedly happened to her earlier in the even-
ing (Tr. 35), and he thereupon took her home and then to 
the Police Station (Tr. 36) from where she was taken to 
the office of Dr. A. L. Curtis for a physical examination at 
about 11:30 p. m. 
Truman Hood was called by the State and he testified 
that he first saw the complaining witness about 10:30 p. 
m. on the day in question as she was crying and staggering 
down the street (Tr. 51); that he took her for a ride to 
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Santaquin and on the way back the complaining witness 
first to~d him of what supposedly happened to her up Pay-
son Canyon (Tr. 53). Hood then testified that the only un-
usual things he noticed about the complaining witness when 
he picked her up was a torn blouse and that she was more 
quiet than usual (Tr. 53, 54). 
Dr. A. L. Curtis testified for the State that he exam-
ined the complaining witness around midnight of the day 
in question (Tr. 4), completing the examination at 12:30 
a. m. (Tr. 8), and that he found blood, and spermatozoa 
in her vagina and evidence of a recent tear of the hymen 
of complaining witness (Tr. 6). Over objection of counsel 
for the defendants, Dr. Curtis was permitted hy the Court 
to testify that an intact hymen normally indicates a per-
son who is a virgin (Tr. 6). Dr. Curtis further testified 
that in his opinion the damage to the female organs of the 
complaining witness occurred within one or two hours of 
her examination (Tr. 7). 
Other than the defendant Hallam, the only witnesses 
called on behalf of the defendants were Bruce White and 
John S. Niemiec, police officers of Salt Lake City, Utah, 
who testified that on or about the 14th day of September, 
1958, the complaining witness stated to them that the two 
boys at Payson who had been charged with raping her had 
not actually made any penetration (Tr. 83 and Tr. 86). 
At the conclusion of the evidence, defendants filed a 
written request that the Court instruct the jury to return 
a verdict of "not guilty" as to each defendant on the ba.ais 
that as a matter of law the evidence produced by the State 
was not sufficient to support a conviction for rape. The 
Trial Court refused to so instruct the jury (R. 41, 42), and 
the defendants took due exception to this refusal (Tr. 89). 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PER:MITTING WITNESS 
FOR THE STATE, DR. A. L. CURTIS, TO TESTIFY THAT 
RESULTS OF HIS EXAMINATION INDICATED THAT 
PRIOR TO THE DAY IN QUESTION THE COMPLAIN-
ING WITNESS HAD BEEN A VIRGIN. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANTS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1 
TO THE JURY DIRECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A 
VERDICT OF "NOT GUILTY" AS TO EACH DEFEND-
ANT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMI'ITING WITNESS 
FOR THE STATE, DR. A. L. CURTIS, TO TESTIFY THAT 
RESULTS OF H[S EXAMINATION INDICATEID THAT 
PRIOR TO THE DAY IN QUESTION THE COMPLAIN-
ING WITNESS HAD BEEN A VIRGIN. 
The general rule is that in prosecutions for rape by 
force and without consent, evidence of the prior chastity 
of the prosecutrix is inadmissible as a substantive defense 
(44 American Jurisprudence 958). The Utah Supreme 
Court so held in the case of State vs. Scott 188 P. 860, and 
also in the case of State vs. Jameson 134 P. 2d, 173, a car-
nal knowledge case, approved an instruction of the trial 
court to the effect "that the chastity or lack of chastity of 
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the prosecutrix is unmaterial in the offense with which de-
fendant was charged". 
Defendants submit that if such evidence is inadmissible 
as a substantive defense, it is likewise immaterial and in-
admissilble when offered by the State in a forceaJble rape 
case. Testimony indicating the prior virginity of the com-
plaining witness, in tms case a fifteen year old girl, could 
have no other effect upon the jury than to excite passion 
and prejudice against the defendants in the minds of the 
jurors and 1Jhe failure of the trial court to exclude such 
testimony over the objection of counsel for the defendants 
could likewise have no other effect upon the jury than to 
make it appear that the virginity of the prosecuting witness 
was a material part of the case. Such a result is even more 
likely as a consequence of the way in which such testimony 
was elicited by counsel for the State (Tr. 6). Dr. Curtis 
had testified as to what physical facts his examination of 
the complaining witness had revealed with no reference 
specifically to her virginity or non-virginity when the fol-
lowing occurred: (Tr. 6) Question by Mr. Frazier, attorney 
for the State: "Now does a hymen which is intact nor-
mally indicate a person who is a virgin?" Mr. Christenson, 
attorney for the defendant: "We object to that as being 
immaterial". The Court: "He may answer". Answer 
by Dr. Curtis: "Yes". Question: "and you say in this case 
the hymen had been torn?" Answer "Yes". 
Defendants contend that such testimony was clearly 
inadmissible, no question of the reputation of the complain-
ing witness being involved, and the failure of the Trial Court 
to exclude such testimony was highly prejudicial to the de-
fendants and precluded them from having a fair trial in 
this matter. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANTS REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBER 1 
TO THE JURY DIRECTING THE JURY TO RETURN A 
VERDICT OF "NOT GUILTY" AS TO EACH DEFEND-
ANT. 
The defendants did not file a motion for a new trial 
in the instant case, but it is their contention that the ques-
tion of the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the ver-
dict of the jury is properly before this Court. Defendants 
strongly contend that the evidence does not sustain the 
verdict of the jury as a matter of law. 
Section 77-37-4, Utah Code Annotated, reads as follows: 
"When written requests to charge have been presented 
and given modified or refused, the questions presented 
in such requests need not be ex:cepted to or embodied 
in the bill of exceptions, but such written requests to 
charge, with the endorsements thereon showing the 
action of the Court, form part of the record, and any 
e:rror in the decision of the Court thereon may be ta-
ken advantage of on appeal in the same manner as if 
presented in a bill of exceptions." 
This Court further said in the case of Law vs. Smith, 
98 P. 300: 
"If the trial Court has passed upon a matter in the course 
of a trial and an exception is taken or is given by the 
statute, the ruling or decision made by the trial court, 
if assigned as error, is befure this court for review on 
appeal." 
During the course of the trial the defendants did sub;. 
mit written requests for instructions to the jury, number 
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1 of which and which was refused by the trial Court, reads 
as follows (R. 41, 42): 
"You are instructed that there has not been sufficient 
evidence produced by the State to support a convic-
tion of the defendants, or either of them, and you are 
therefore directed to return a verdict of "not guilty" 
as to each defendant." 
Exception to the trial Court's refusal to give such in-
struction was taken by the defendants (Tr. 89). 
This Court held in the case of State vs. Laub, 131 P. 
2d 805, that: 
"It is not our province on appeal to judge the credibility 
of witness when their testimony is in direct conflict. 
We are concerned only with the question of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to sustain the conviction by 
showing that the jury could have found beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that the defendants were guilty." 
However, in the case at hand conflicts in testimony 
exist not only between some witnesses for the State and 
those for the defendants, but two of the State's own wit-
nesses directly contradict much of the critical testimony 
of the complaining witness relative to the commission of the 
alleged crime. 
The Court said in the case of Schlatter vs. McCarthy, 
196 P. 2d 968: 
"Generally, a party who calls a witness vouches for his 
veracity and cannot afterwards impeach such witness, 
either by testimony of an impeaching witness or by 
argument to the jury and he may not argue to the 
jury that such witness is unworthy of belief." 
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Certain exceptions to the above rule do exist, such as 
when the witness is called as an adverse witness or when a 
calling party is surprised by the unexpected testimony of 
the witness, but in this case the State did not call Marcia 
Hallam and Rosalie Kinser as adverse witnesses nor claim 
them to be so, nor could the State, or did it, claim surprise 
as to their testimony since the State was fully aware of 
what their testimony was, having heard both testify sub-
stantially the same at the first trial of the case. 
In respect of the time when the alleged attack occurred, 
the complaining witness testified that she was held in the 
car against her will by the defendants for about an hour 
(Tr. 33), while the other two girls were absent from the 
car. On the other hand, witnesses for the StateRosalie 
Kinser and Marsha Hallam, each testified that they were 
away from the car for only five minutes (Tr. 43, 47). The 
complaining witness testified that all during the time she 
was held in the car by the defendants she was kicking, 
cursing, and yelling loudly (Tr. 36), while the two girls 
called as witnesses by the State testified that they were 
only a short distance from the car, only 30 pa.ces away, 
according to Marcia Hallam ('Th'. 47), always in view of the 
car (Tr. 43), and yet they saw no commotion, nor heard 
any shouting or yelling from the car and that had there 
been such a ruckus as the complaining witness described, 
they would have heard it (Tr. 45, 47). Complaining wit-
ness testified that when she was finally let out of the car 
by the defendants she was crying and couldn't calm down 
(Tr. 30), yet State's witness Rosalie Kinser observed noth-
ing unusual about the complaining witness at the time (Tr. 
44). Complaining witness testified on direct examination 
that when the defendants let her out of the car she talked 
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with the other two girls about what had happened to her 
(Tr. 32, 33), which was dfln,ied by the other two witnesses 
for the State (Tr. 44, 48), but on cross-examination the 
complaining witness admitted that she had said nothing 
to the other two girls regarding what supposedly happened 
to her in the car (Tr. 37), 
~here is no conflict in the testimony with respect to 
the time the occupants of the ear arrived back at the car-
nival in Payson, both State witnesses Marcia Hallam and 
Rosalie Kinser fixing such time at ten minutes to ten (Tr. 
45, 49), so it is clear that if the complaining witness was 
attacked by the defendants, as she claims, such attack 
would have had to occur at least several minutes prior to 
the ten minutes to ten, since it would have taken some time 
to walk around up the canyon after the attack as complain-
ing witness claimed she did (Tr. 31, 32), and to have driven 
back down the Canyon to the Payson carnival. In view of 
this evidence offered by the State, it is clear that consid-
erably more than two hours elapsed between the time of 
the alleged attack and the time at midnight when the com-
plaining witness was examined by Dr. Curtis (Tr. 4), who 
stated that the physical injuries to her would have had to 
occur within one or two hours. 
In view of these substantial conflicts of testimony 
among the various witnesses called by the State as to what 
happened in respect to much of the critical evidence in 
the case, defendants earnestly contend that the jury as a 
matter of law could not reasonably have found that there 
was no reasonable doubt about the guilt of the defendants. 
In order to find as they did the jury had to disregard al-
most the entire testimony of two of the witnesses called by 
the State, the veracity of whom the State vouched for by 
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calling them to the stand. This is not a case where the Su-
preme Court is called upon to judge the credibility of wit-
nesses for the State as compared to those for the defense, 
something which it has said it will not do, but it is rather 
a case where to sustain the verdict of the jury, the Court 
must, as the jury obviously did, make a selection from 
among witnesses for the State to find evidence to support 
a conviction and thereby disregard equally competent tes-
timony from other State witnesses, which testimony at least 
gives rise to a very grave doubt as to the guilt of the de-
fendants, and all without extending any credibility to the 
testimony offered by the defendants. 
The complaining witness doubtless had intercourse with 
someone on the night in question, but to say that the evi-
dence produced by the State, as much in conflict within 
itself as it was, could justify the jury in finding beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendants were guilty of rape, 
does great violence to the idea of justice. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the defendants earnestly assert that they 
were denied a fair trial in the Court below by reason of the 
admission of testimony respecting the prior virginity of the 
complaining witness, which testimony was wholly imma-
terial and was calculated to and doubtless did incite preju-
dice in the minds of the jury against the defendants. They 
further assert that, even without considering the evidence 
produced by the defendants as to their innocence, the evi-
dence produced by the State was so much in conflict with 
itself, the jury could not as a matter of law reasonably 
have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants 
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were guilty of rape. Consequently the verdict of the jury 
below and the judgment thereupon should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Cullen Y. Christenson, 
foc caruffiTENSON, NOVAK, PAU~N 
AND TAYLOR, 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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